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Political-institutional barriers to energy efficiency 
1. Introduction 
Energy efficiency has been touted as a critical component of societies’ 
response to the challenges of climate change, economic development, and energy 
security [1,2]. Substantial improvements in energy efficiency can “reduce the need 
for investment in energy infrastructure, cut fuel costs, increase competitiveness, 
lessen exposure to fuel price volatility, increase energy affordability for low-income 
households and cut local and global pollutants improving consumer welfare” [3, p. 
36]. Energy efficiency is considered a major energy resource, as it can potentially 
deliver reductions in demand exceeding any other fuel output in several countries. 
Hence it is not merely a “hidden” fuel, but is in fact the “first fuel” [4]. 
 There are two widely recognized caveats to this potential. First, the Jevons 
paradox – the tendency for efficiency improvements to lead to increased demand – 
tells us that energy efficiency gains are followed by a rebound effect, diminishing the 
overall impact of the measures on energy demand [5]. Real energy efficiency 
improvements are bound to be smaller than their initial theoretical potential, and 
the extent of this difference can be substantial. Part of this rebound effect may not 
be a negative outcome, as it may simply follow from the “taking back” of energy 
savings in order to achieve health benefits, poverty alleviation, or productivity 
improvements that were otherwise inaccessible to consumers, for instance [6]. In 
any event, this effect leads several authors to argue that efficiency improvements 
need to be governed with care, for instance by being coupled with conservation 
policies (e.g., [7]). 
 The second caveat is that energy efficiency remains a puzzle to many analysts 
because even when they make economic, environmental, cultural, and social sense, 
improvement measures often do not materialize. For various reasons, there exists 
an “energy efficiency gap” or “energy paradox” [8-15] (see also [16,17]).  
 The potential benefits of energy efficiency and these two caveats have led to 
rich literatures that classify barriers of various forms. These classifications helped 
feed studies that attempt to comprehend and empirically measure barriers to 
improved energy efficiency, and consequently provide more specific 
recommendations as to how these can be overcome. We contribute to these 
literatures on barriers to the adoption and successful implementation of energy 
efficiency measures, by focusing on political-institutional barriers. Whereas various 
scholars looked at barriers of different forms (economic, behavioral, organizational, 
and cultural, in particular), the attention to political-institutional barriers has been 
limited, especially in classification efforts. However, as we show in this paper, a 
specific understanding of these barriers can play a critical role, as efforts to 
overcome other types of barriers are likely to be insufficient without careful 
consideration of their political-institutional counterparts, which may prove very 
difficult to eliminate.  
The article follows a straightforward structure. First, we review the relevant 
literature to situate our contribution. Second, we propose a definition of political-
institutional barriers and describe what makes them distinct from other types of 
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barriers. We then present a classification of political-institutional barriers, which we 
developed with the objective of facilitating the identification of specific types of 
political-institutional difficulties or obstacles to the adoption, design, or 
implementation of energy efficiency measures. Finally, to show the importance that 
these barriers can have in practice, we illustrate the occurrence of these barriers in 
three case studies in section 4. The cases were chosen for their illustrative potential, 
but broad generalizations are avoided. We discuss the factors highlighted by these 
cases in the conclusion.   
 
2. Methods and literature review 
 
Spanning over more than three decades, rich literatures from various 
theoretical perspectives now detail barriers to – and, more recently, drivers of – 
energy efficiency. For our literature review, we covered – from the more general to 
the more specific – political economy, energy policy, and energy efficiency studies. 
We looked both at studies that provide classification attempts for barriers, as well 
as work that discusses different solutions to barriers, including recent reports from 
international institutions such as the International Energy Agency, the United 
Nations Environment Programme, and the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization.  
Moreover, the discussions about conceptual frameworks to understand, 
analyze, and address barriers to improvements in energy efficiency have been 
enriched more recently by empirical attempts to provide recommendations 
depending on firm size, country, type of activity, or sub-sector (for a summary, see 
[18,19]). Since energy efficiency usually has its place, to varying degrees, in the 
energy policy of most national governments (see [20]), several studies provide 
helpful insights into how the governance of energy efficiency can effectively 
overcome these barriers [4, 21-23]. Throughout the review, we focused on the 
attention that these contributions have given to barriers related to political actors 
and institutions. 
Many recent studies, including empirical work attempting to measure 
barriers, start from Sorrell et al.’s classification [13,14,24] which categorize barriers 
according to different theoretical backgrounds. In the economic category, market 
failures (e.g., imperfect information, split incentives, adverse selection, principal-
agent relationships) are distinguished from market barriers (e.g., heterogeneity, 
hidden costs, access to capital, risk). The behavioral category regroups barriers such 
as bounded rationality, inertia, or values, while the organizational type includes 
power distribution and culture within the firm [17].  
Sorrell et al., however, exclude barriers found in earlier empirical studies 
that stem from political-institutional factors, treating them separately as “contextual 
factors” [24]. Observing results from empirical studies, the authors mention for 
instance that “’the government does not give incentive to improve energy efficiency’, 
‘lack of enforcement of government regulations’ and ‘lack of coordination between 
different government agencies’ fail to explain why cost-effective technologies are 
being neglected by individual organizations” [24, p. 42]. At first glance, this is 
surprising: in several earlier classification attempts, part of the discussion on 
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barriers has revolved around the role of government actors in impeding energy 
efficiency improvements in various sectors. In a short but oft-cited contribution, 
Weber, for instance, distinguished four types of barriers: behavioral, organizational, 
market and institutional. Of these, the latter type refers to barriers “caused by 
political institutions, i.e. state government and local authorities” [15]. Hirst and 
Brown had also pointed to “structural” barriers outside the control of the individual 
end-user, which included codes and standards, as well as government fiscal and 
regulatory policies [9]. To be sure, Sorrell et al. do argue that these factors can have 
an important influence, but do not consider them to be barriers, since the focus in 
the framework is on decisions and behaviors within firms. As a result, the discussion 
neglects an elaborate development of the actors and institutions external to these 
organizations. This is an important lack: Reddy [25], for instance, had described a 
more thorough list of all actors influencing improvements to energy efficiency, 
which included politicians, government agencies and departments, and 
international institutions.  
Empirical studies and reviews also alternatively list some form or another of 
barriers linked to governmental actors, for instance insufficient enforcement of 
standards [26], lack of governance leadership/interest [27], weak legislation [28], 
limited financial incentives by the government for energy efficiency [28], lack of 
integration of energy and environmental issues during policy formulation [29], or 
non-existing labels/standards for energy-efficient products/processes [29]. Other 
recent studies have also pointed to different government or regulatory barriers, but 
again merely provide an incomplete list of some examples found in empirical 
studies (e.g., [30-33]). 
To our knowledge, there exists no systematic attempt to conceptualize this 
type of barrier and categorize the different possibilities. One interesting 
contribution is Cagno et al. [34], who proposed an expansion of Sorrell et al.’s 
framework, pointing to shortcomings and empirical difficulties. Cagno et al. 
introduce the notion of barriers that are “external” vs. “internal” to the firm, and 
leave a place for “government/politics” barriers, insisting that “regulation and policy 
may affect the diffusion of technologies and/or energy suppliers imposing standards 
or particular policies to regulate the market, modifying the price and/or the 
availability of services/products, as well as influencing a single firm through various 
policies” [34, p. 295]. However, they not only simplify this category down to either 
“lack of proper regulation” or “distortion in fiscal policies”, but also end up 
incorporating these two possibilities within internal “information” barriers as part 
of the empirical framework. The same can be said of Thollander and Palm’s 
comprehensive discussion of barriers [17], which explicitly includes Weber’s 
“institutional” barriers, but remains limited to briefly listing “codes and standards” 
and “government fiscal and regulatory policies” as “structural barriers”, with little 
development.   
 Another interesting attempt to provide a more complete framework comes in 
Reddy’s “actor approach” taxonomy [35], which differentiates barriers at the micro 
(project) level, the meso level (related to the organizations affiliated with the 
project), and the macro level (state, market or society). This approach provides an 
important contribution in detailing the causal mechanisms linking barriers to 
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outcomes. Reddy provides examples of barriers of the political type, which are 
spread across the meso level (understaffed implementing agencies, for instance) 
and the macro level (energy policy legislation, for instance), and argues for the 
identification of actors and institutions having different responsibilities and roles 
depending on the level of the barriers identified.  
This leaves several gaps to address. It is our contention that efforts to 
identify and suggest ways to remove barriers to improvements in energy efficiency 
will remain incomplete or prove ineffective without proper consideration for 
barriers of the political-institutional type. Many of the contributions of these 
literatures downplay or give little attention to political-institutional barriers, and 
although some of these barriers are indeed considered by several authors, many 
issues remain regarding the understanding we have of them. Despite a tacit 
recognition of their presence and importance by several studies, they are loosely 
classified (when they are classified at all), alternatively termed regulatory [20,23], 
institutional [12,19, 29], government-related [25], or contextual [24], often with no 
specific delimitation, and accompanied with few examples. In our view, these efforts 
also provide insufficient conceptualization of these barriers, give little attention to 
the political process behind changes in legislation and regulation – or the absence 
thereof – and provide us with limited information as to how these “external” 
barriers affect the decision by firms to invest or not in measures to improve energy 
efficiency.  
There is also some confusion regarding the meaning of “institutional” in this 
context, as it is sometimes used to refer to plants and producers (e.g., [20,23]) 
instead of political or administrative institutions. Additionally, it is often not clear 
whether the discussion about political issues linked to energy efficiency efforts 
should be part of the debates over solutions to other types of barriers (i.e., policy 
intervention to resolve barriers), or should be considered as barriers in themselves, 
to which several solutions may be considered.   
We argue that part of this confusion lies in insufficient attention and detail 
given to the categorization of these types of barriers, and since there seems to be a 
consensus that policy is key in overcoming several other types of barriers, 
understanding their political-institutional counterpart is critical in order to prevent 
or avoid further difficulties in the design and implementation of measures to 
improve energy efficiency.  
 
3. Framework for political-institutional barriers 
 
3.1 Definition 
 
In this section, we provide a clarification of the concept of political-
institutional barrier. This allows us to clearly circumscribe what we include and, by 
extension, what we exclude from the barriers considered. There are some 
ambiguities in trying to classify barriers to energy efficiency, and differentiating 
political-institutional barriers from their economic, organizational, behavioral, or 
cultural counterparts needs to be done with care. First, following from Weber [15, p. 
834] and Sorrell et al. [14, p. 27], we consider that the term barrier (to energy 
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efficiency improvements) itself has in fact three components: an objective obstacle, 
a subject hindered, and an action hindered. As Weber discusses, this distinction 
supposes the existence of a variety of specific obstacles (e.g., persons, attitudes, or 
regulations), subjects hindered (e.g., consumers, managers, or politicians), and 
actions hindered (e.g., buying more efficient equipment, or decreeing an energy tax) 
[15, p. 834]. 
As can be inferred from the classification and aspects discussed below, we 
use the term “political-institutional” in a broad sense. To differentiate with the other 
types of barriers identified in the literature reviewed in the previous section, we 
thus consider political-institutional barriers to be those obstacles that originate 
from, are controlled by, or are caused by factors directly related to political 
institutions. This includes characteristics pertaining either to the political-
institutional environment (the fundamental political rules that serve as the basis for 
production, exchange, and distribution) or to political-institutional arrangements 
(the governance structure and its evolution and interaction with the institutional 
environment) [36, pp. 132–133; 37, pp. 25–26]. “Political-institutional”, in this 
context, incorporates a variety of macro-level institutions such as political regime 
type and governance structures (federalism, for instance), meso-level institutions 
such as public and political organizations and the rules by which they abide (a 
ministry or a government agency, for instance), as well as micro-level institutions 
such as behavioral and social expectations towards politicians and members of 
public and governmental organizations (political leadership, for instance).  
 
3.2 Classification  
We classify these political-institutional barriers as one of three different 
forms: political obstruction, conflicting guidelines in governance structure, and lack 
of policy coordination. Each of these forms, in turn, presents itself in different 
variations.  
 
3.2.1 Political obstruction 
Political obstruction is a first category of political-institutional barrier, and 
can take different forms. This represents situations where actions – or lack thereof – 
by government leaders and key policymakers impede efforts to put on the agenda, 
elaborate, or successfully implement energy efficiency measures, even despite the 
absence of particular reluctance from industry or consumer groups. For instance, 
lack of political backing of measures and legislation to improve energy efficiency, 
and political opposition or indifference can make a difference in the elaboration of 
energy efficiency programs and regulations [22], as “government representatives 
are key to make pressure for energy efficiency” [38, p. 1137] (see also [39,40]).  
In some instances, substantial political will – the “extent of committed 
support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular 
problem” [41, p. 659] – becomes a necessary condition for reforms or changes to 
occur. Opposition can come from various individuals and collective actors having 
formal and informal veto power on new regulation or legislation. These veto players 
can be institutional (a legislature requiring the assent of two chambers for a bill to 
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pass, for instance) or partisan (the party in power’s position regarding a given 
policy option, for instance) [42]. 
Both categories of veto players have an impact on the potential for the 
political obstruction barrier to affect progress on energy efficiency measures. For 
instance, a higher number of veto players may increase the likelihood for policy 
changes to be incremental rather than major, and may simply reduce the rate of 
policy adoption, as Madden [43] has shown for climate change policy. This type of 
barrier is likely to be at its worst when the number of veto players for energy 
efficiency legislation is high, when the government in place lacks a champion taking 
charge of energy efficiency efforts, or when the governance structure makes this 
need for political backing highest (more on this latter point in 3.2.2 below). 
Another source of political obstruction comes from high levels of corruption, 
as well as lack of political stability and effectiveness. These contexts generally 
impede energy efficiency initiatives, as the result is a higher discount rate for 
investors in energy efficient technologies. This especially affects investments in 
long-term capital goods like capital-intensive energy efficiency technologies, which 
can be particularly problematic in developing countries [12, p. 6] (see also [27]). 
Even in OECD countries, however, greater corruptibility reduces the stringency of 
energy efficiency policy [44]. 
 
3.2.2 Conflicting guidelines in governance structure  
A second category of barriers results from conflicting guidelines within the 
energy efficiency governance structure. At the national level, conflicting interests 
between different government departments, for instance a ministry focused on 
economic growth and another one dealing with the protection of the environment, 
may result from the departments’ different objectives and preferences with regard 
to the pace, nature, and extent of energy efficiency regulation. Which department 
has jurisdiction over the energy efficiency governance can have an impact on 
broader inter-department battles, as can the power distribution between these 
departments.  
Moreover, diverging actions between different agencies having partial 
authority over energy efficiency can be problematic. In an IEA report, Limaye et al. 
[20] identified seven different governance models for energy efficiency. Energy 
efficiency governance can be conducted under: a government agency with broad 
energy responsibilities, such as the United States Department of Energy; a 
government agency focusing primarily on clean energy or sustainable energy, such 
as the Australian Greenhouse Office; a government agency focusing entirely on 
energy efficiency, such as Canada’s Office of Energy Efficiency; an independent 
authority created by statute to promote energy efficiency and/or clean energy, such 
as the United Kingdom Energy Saving Trust; an independent corporation owned 
entirely by the government, such as South Africa’s National Energy Efficiency 
Agency; a corporation through public-private partnership, such as the Polish 
National Conservation Agency; or a non-profit or non-governmental organization, 
such as the Austrian Energy Agency [20, pp. 25–33]. These models are represented 
throughout the world in various forms, and the authors’ classification goes to show 
the important variability in the way that energy efficiency governance is treated in 
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political and administrative circles. These different approaches to governance can 
lead to actions framed towards different goals.  
Each of these models comes with a different set of advantages and 
limitations, for instance regarding the ability to secure funds, the political clout 
within the government, the size of the staff dedicated to energy efficiency, or the 
flexibility in asking for outside advice (see Appendix). Consequently, given that 
modifying the structure of government agencies and departments is usually 
politically cumbersome, these features have an impact on the facility with which 
energy efficiency measures can be designed and enacted. Many of these difficulties 
have to do with the effectiveness in the design and implementation of energy 
efficiency programs and measures; however, they can also prevent initiatives 
coming from the private sector if, for instance, the regulatory authority resides in an 
agency traditionally closed to input from industry, or if the authority is perceived by 
private actors as diffuse and ambiguous. 
Another aspect is the relevant agency’s inadequate capacity to enforce 
mandatory measures and regulations. Apart from the structure of authority 
mentioned above, insufficient funding and staff can lead to lack of enforcement 
effectiveness [28,45], which may be particularly problematic if the measures are 
intended to be aggressive, or if they require a substantial change in current 
consumer or industry practices. Note that this is also affected by which of the 
governance models is in place, as certain models normally have more difficulty 
accessing public funds (see Appendix).  
 
3.2.3 Lack of policy coordination 
 A third category of political-institutional barriers regroups policy 
coordination failures and impediments. While some of these may be closely 
associated with one or more of the governance structure issues described above 
(more on this in 3.3 below), they can operate independently and as such are treated 
as distinct barriers. A first example is the existence of multiple non-harmonized 
standards internationally. Harmonized international standards for testing, efficiency 
classifications and labels constitute barriers to international trade and prevent 
manufacturers from realizing economies of scale [38,46].  
A second and related example of a policy coordination barrier is a similar 
process found at the country level, when different standards exist for sub-national 
jurisdictions. Codes and standards surrounding energy efficiency can present the 
same scattered features as internationally, producing similar difficulties at the 
national level. This is likely to be the case in federations, especially if jurisdictional 
responsibility is not at the national level (e.g., [30]). 
A third and related example is when these codes, standards, and other 
energy efficiency measures are contradictory, whether between jurisdictions or 
between sectors (e.g., [17,47]). Building construction codes, for instance, can hinder 
efforts to streamline the use of new energy technologies that may have energy 
efficiency advantages [48]. This barrier is especially problematic given that setting 
and revising codes and standards is often a long process dominated by special 
interests, and variations in codes cause or contribute to a fragmentation of the 
market and compounds manufacturing inefficiencies [9, p. 273]. Furthermore, this 
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type of coordination issue can make it cumbersome to obtain government permits 
needed to deploy energy efficiency devices and processes [49].  
 A fourth example is regulation producing an incentive structure hindering 
energy efficiency measures. This can be particularly problematic with regard to 
energy providers, when regulation makes the profitability of providers rely on 
energy sales – for instance, energy tariffs that discourage energy efficiency 
investments, such as declining block prices [23], thus creating a disincentive to 
participate in supporting or delivering energy efficiency improvements to 
customers [20]. This is another version of the “split incentive” barrier, which occurs 
when the potential adopter of energy efficiency measures is not the party that uses 
the energy (and thus differs from the one who enjoys the energy savings), for 
instance in a tenant-owner relationship. In this case, however, the barrier is caused 
directly by regulation. 
 
3.3 Links and interactions between barriers  
Table 1 summarizes these categories of barriers. Although the categorization 
presented above serves to distinguish specific barriers and can be useful to address 
them, political-institutional barriers rarely appear in an isolated form, and in this 
section we consider possible interactions between instances.  
Possible combinations or interactions are of course not particular to 
political-institutional barriers. Risk aversion, for instance, may be linked to (or 
worsened by) imperfect information barriers, if the missing information is the one 
needed to make proper risk assessments. Other possibilities of overlap and 
interactions have been pointed out, notably in [13,50], and further developed in 
[19,51,52], among others. For our purpose here, however, the discussion will 
remain limited to links between barriers of the three types described above.  
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Table 1 – Categories of political-institutional barriers to energy efficiency (EE) 
Category of 
barrier 
General description Examples  
Political 
obstruction 
Individual actions by 
political figures – or 
lack thereof – impede 
EE efforts 
• Lack of political backing to EE measures/veto 
players opposed to EE 
• Corruption and lack of political stability and 
effectiveness increase discount rates for 
investors 
Conflicting 
guidelines in 
governance 
structure 
Problems linked to the 
EE governance 
structure 
• Conflicting interests between different 
government departments/agencies 
• Diverging actions from different agencies 
having partial authority over energy efficiency 
• Inappropriate administrative capacity/flexibility 
Lack of policy 
coordination 
Policy coordination 
failures and 
impediments 
• Existence of multiple non-harmonized 
standards internationally 
• Existence of different standards for sub-
national jurisdictions 
• Contradictory regulation between jurisdictions 
or sectors 
• Regulation causing incentive structure that 
hinders EE measures 
  
As a first example of this, political obstruction may be closely associated with 
battles within the governance structure. For instance, a clash between different 
priorities with regard to energy efficiency measures across two or more ministries 
is often related to more personal political infighting. This combination can take the 
form of a battle between key figures of the ministries, with the government 
leadership also taking a role. The aspect we want to highlight is that although the 
impediments to energy efficiency improvements here would seem be caused by 
conflicting guidelines in the governance structure (because two different ministries 
have a say), the barrier can actually be worsened by political obstruction. Put 
differently, any potential solution to the governance structure problem will be 
difficult if there is no way to get around the more personal clashes.  
Another example is the possible link between conflicting guidelines in the 
governance structure and contradictory or uneven policies across subnational 
jurisdictions, a policy coordination problem. In a federation, if jurisdictional power 
is shared between the national and subnational levels, lack of action at the higher 
level – and lack of collaboration and coordination between subnational 
governments – will likely result in scattered measures and regulations across the 
country. So in this case, even if the direct barrier to energy efficiency is primarily 
one of lack of policy coordination, it could be prevented or improved by removing 
the governance structure issue. Similarly, the problem of the incentive structure for 
energy providers hindering energy efficiency improvements, mentioned in 3.2.3 
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above, can also be influenced by the governance structure, for instance if the energy 
providers are publicly owned and have influence over energy efficiency policy. 
Resolving this situation requires giving attention to the combination of barriers, 
which may end up differing from considering each one individually. 
 The point here is that the categorization of barriers laid out above should 
serve to obtain a detailed understanding of possibly several barriers (including ones 
not falling under the political-institutional type). The potential interactions and 
combinations outlined in this section hint that a holistic approach to barriers should 
be taken when trying to address a given instance.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
In this section, we use examples to illustrate certain dimensions of these 
barriers at play. Three cases are discussed, each highlighting one of the categories 
mentioned in section 3.2. 
 
4.1 Political obstruction: transport fuel efficiency in the United States 
 As a first illustration of a political-institutional barrier to more stringent 
energy efficiency measures, the case of fuel efficiency regulation in the United States 
is considered. Two main policy tools have been used historically to promote more 
efficiency in transportation in the United States: fuel taxes, at both the federal and 
state level; and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, initiated 
following the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74. Both categories of policies have 
repeatedly shown how political obstruction is a key barrier to higher energy 
efficiency in the transport sector, and we consider here each of these broad 
categories of policies.  
 First, fuel taxes are often considered to be the most effective policy tool to 
increase fuel efficiency in transport, as they represent a direct means to target a 
specific product’s price (here, gasoline), having in theory the most direct impact on 
consumer behavior – as well as car manufacturer behavior, in the consumption and 
fuel efficiency of vehicles offered, as a result [53,54]. In practice, indeed, countries 
with lower domestic taxes on gasoline tend to have higher consumption rates, and 
vice-versa [55].  
 The second main policy tool used in the United States to improve fuel 
efficiency in the transport sector is the CAFE standards, which target new light-duty 
vehicles, further differentiating between cars and trucks. Despite much stricter 
standards in other regions with similar socio-economic conditions, standards have 
remained very low in the United States [56]. More interesting to us, however, is the 
fact that they remained virtually unchanged from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, 
despite multiple attempts over the years to increase them or change the rules for 
how they are applied. 
 For instance, in 1994, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA), responsible for writing and enforcing the standards, published a notice 
stating that it was considering an adjustment to fuel economy standards for trucks 
before the decade would be out. This awoke lobbying from car manufacturers and 
opposition in Congress, and the next year, the House of Representatives passed the 
FY1996 Department of Transportation Appropriation, which explicitly prohibited 
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the use of funds to change CAFE rules. After it became law, a similar scenario was 
repeated in each of the following years, with some opposition in the Senate 
(ultimately unsuccessful), and the standards (as well as their structure) remained 
unchanged for the rest of the decade [57]. 
 Part of this opposition to raising the standards during the 1990s was 
certainly attributable to the low prices for gasoline, and when these increased at the 
turn of the century, support built to both remove this appropriation prohibition and 
reconsider raising the standards. The former efforts were successful, but multiple 
propositions for increasing standards in the wake of 9/11-related energy security 
concerns ultimately failed.  
 More durable movement finally came when the Energy Independence and 
Security Act (EISA) 2007 managed to increase the standards on the 2020 horizon, 
measures defended by the Bush administration in its efforts to reduce dependency 
on oil. Furthermore, the Obama administration announced in 2009 substantially 
stricter standards for the 2012-2016 period, along with additional standards for CO2 
emitted by cars. This was followed by an agreement with thirteen large automakers 
that further increased the target fuel economy standard by model year 2025 [58]. 
 The lack of change in the standards for the 20-year period preceding the EISA 
2007, and the substantial modifications since, show how basic political obstruction 
(here the United States Congress, and mostly the House of Representatives, acted as 
a major veto point) is an important factor impeding modifications to energy 
efficiency policy. Although the reasons for this obstruction can be quite varied – 
asymmetric lobbying, political ideology, and oil prices certainly had an influence in 
this case – the actions of legislators and leaders from the executive branch play a 
crucial role in the evolution of these efforts. Without generalizing from this single 
case, a higher number of veto players, both institutional and partisan, seems to 
decrease the likelihood of modifications to the status quo (here, in the form of more 
stringent energy efficiency legislation). 
 Moreover, it is worth noting that political obstruction is only one dimension 
of the political-institutional impediments that restrained fuel efficiency 
improvements. The governance structure was one where the agency responsible for 
CAFE standards was within the executive branch of the federal government, and 
clearly did not have the independence required to secure funding and hence full 
autonomy in its actions. This highlights how the autonomy of an agency with energy 
efficiency responsibilities is as important as its independence, especially as far as 
funding is concerned. Nevertheless, this example illustrates how political 
obstruction can be a particularly important and resilient obstacle. 
 
4.2 Conflicting guidelines in governance structure: energy efficiency in the Quebec, 
Canada electricity sector 
Hydro-Québec is a government-owned public utility overseeing the 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in the Canadian province of 
Quebec. Established in 1944, it has undergone several changes to its structure and 
to the distribution of authority for different aspects of energy production and use 
over the years, and responsibility for energy efficiency was no exception. We focus 
here on the period covering the latter half of the 1990s decade, where energy 
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efficiency objectives have repeatedly been decreased, ignored, or abandoned by 
Hydro-Quebec. This is meant to illustrate a barrier stemming from conflicting 
guidelines in the governance structure, where the objectives of a government 
department, corporation, or agency conflict with authority for designing and 
implementing energy efficiency measures. 
 When the Quebec “energy debate” occurred in the mid-1990s regarding the 
future of Hydro-Québec, the new objectives for energy efficiency put forward a few 
years earlier by the public monopoly suddenly decreased, and backed away from 
the targets it had put forward earlier in the decade. Then, despite recommendations 
from the Economy and Labor Commission (Commission de l’économie et du travail) 
to put back the old approach in place, Hydro-Québec continued with its reluctance 
and completely bypassed it when publishing its 1998-2002 action plan [59]. 
Energy efficiency in Quebec at the time was officially under the jurisdiction of 
the Energy Efficiency Agency (Agence de l’efficacité énergétique). The Agency was 
originally created in 1977 as the Office of Energy Savings (Bureau des économies 
d’énergie), and replaced in 1992 by the Energy Efficiency Management (Direction de 
l’efficacité énergétique), attached to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy. 
In 1997, it was again renamed and reorganized as the Energy Efficiency Agency to 
oversee energy efficiency measures. However, with regard to electricity, plans had 
to be proposed by Hydro-Québec. As a result, responsibility for the size, pace, and 
nature of improvements rested with the public monopoly.  
 There was an important if straightforward conflict of interest for Hydro-
Québec within this structure. On the one hand, it had to put forward global plans 
and timelines for improving energy efficiency around electricity production, 
transmission and consumption. On the other hand, its main source of revenue came 
from the sale of electricity. Given the political difficulties associated with any 
proposal to raise electricity prices in Quebec, this implied that at least to a certain 
extent, Hydro-Quebec revenues were dependent on the volume of sales. This led 
several groups to point to the inability for Hydro-Québec to realize a substantial 
energy efficiency program, given these conflicting objectives [60,61].  
 There are several reasons for this reluctance, which do not lie solely in the 
conflicts within the governance structure. Political will in the form of leadership 
from the electricity monopoly, for instance, can partly explain differences between 
this example and more positive results in the Canadian province of British Columbia, 
where a largely similar electricity governance structure is in place. Although the 
Quebec electricity governance represents a somewhat rare institutional 
arrangement, what we want to highlight with this example is that the governance 
structure dimension seems to have been a key barrier that prevented more progress 
on the energy efficiency front during that period. The extraction of full 
responsibilities for energy efficiency from Hydro-Québec to an independent third 
party like a more autonomous Energy Efficiency Agency could have prevented or 
attenuated this type of problem, given the specific situation of the Quebec public 
monopoly [60,62]. 
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4.3 Lack of policy coordination: minimum efficiency performance standards (MEPS) 
for electric motors 
 Electric motors represent 46% of global electricity use [46]. The industrial 
sector accounts for more than 60% of this consumption, where these can be used for 
mechanical movement, in pumps, in fans, or in compressors, which means motors 
used in this sector consume over a quarter of the world’s electricity production. 
Additionally, the efficiency improvement potential is considerable [46]. This 
situation has made electric motors a target of energy efficiency policy around the 
world for at least the past two decades. However, for many years these efforts were 
slowed down because of various barriers, and we focus here on one: a policy 
coordination barrier at the international level regarding efficiency testing standards.  
 Although motors and motor-driven equipment have been traded globally for 
many decades, discrepancies in many different national and regional standards for 
size, efficiency and verification of energy efficiency hampered a harmonized and 
transparent market development towards more energy efficient models. In 
particular, electric motor efficiency testing methods and procedures produced 
different results and thus did not allow motor manufacturers to compete in a 
transparent and credible fashion, especially in markets with mandatory energy 
performance standards [38]. Even after the introduction of minimum efficiency 
performance standards (MEPS) in the United States in 1992, a major policy 
development that was accompanied by a similar policy in Canada and that would 
lead the way for changes much later in the European Union, controversy over 
testing standards remained in the 1990s. 
The main point of contention was a variation in testing methods [38,63], 
which in turn caused the different grid supply frequencies (60Hz for most of the 
Americas and Japan vs. 50Hz for Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia) to lead to 
different claims depending on the region of applicability. The North American 
prevailing testing method came from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE 112-B), and was based on direct efficiency measurement. The 
prevailing European standard set by the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC 60034-2), on the other hand, was based on an indirect measurement, which 
tended to overestimate efficiency, especially in small motor sizes [64,65]. 
 This relatively simple discrepancy between standards proved to be an 
important barrier to international trade, and hampered the diffusion of more energy 
efficient electric motors by preventing manufacturers from being able to realize 
economies of scale. Different standards meant that comparability of efficiency and 
energy consumption for similar motors was difficult across regions – notably the 
North American and European markets – which increased testing costs, especially 
for manufacturers providing products for global markets [66, p. 82].   
 Due to the attention given to this problem in the late 1990s [63,65], efforts 
began to revise the IEC 60034-2 standard so that an efficiency classification of 
motors at the global level would be possible. This led to the IEC 60034-2-1 standard, 
published in 2007. This not only made it possible to have a direct correspondence 
between North American (Epact/NEMA Premium), Chinese (Class 1/2/3), 
Australian (MEPS 2002 and 2006), and European efficiency classification (the 
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Eff1/Eff2/Eff3 European MEPS were passed into law shortly after), but also 
triggered similar developments in other markets, notably India [67]. 
 This shows how the lack of coordination between standards at the global 
level can prevent a greater and smoother diffusion of more energy efficient 
technologies, but also that the effectiveness of certain policies intended to increase 
the use of these technologies (for instance, the MEPS enacted in North America in 
1992) can be affected by the lack of coordination with other jurisdictions in the 
global market. The absence of harmonized standards for entire motor systems has 
also been identified as an important barrier to eliminate in the future [46,68].  
As in the previous two cases, it should be noted that lack of policy 
coordination was only one dimension of the political-institutional obstacles that 
slowed progress on electric motors energy efficiency. Leadership from the United 
States Department of Energy, for instance, helped efforts to legislate more stringent 
MEPS in 1992, while European efforts came only much later. Moreover, efforts from 
the Department of Energy were helped by its collaboration with the different 
industry associations, notably the National Electrical Manufacturer Association 
(NEMA), the American Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy (ACEEE), and the 
Consortium for Energy Efficiency (CEE). Moreover, for our purpose, it should 
further be noted that this type of international policy coordination barrier may be 
one of the most difficult to resolve, because of the potential unwillingness of certain 
major countries’ agencies to participate and agree on a given standard, or because of 
the lack of an international body with strong authority to impose such a standard on 
all participating members.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
These three cases suggest that there are no easy fixes for any of these 
barriers. On the face of it, an agency independent from political power, especially 
where competition for the provision of energy is limited, would seem to present the 
highest potential for minimizing barriers of the first and second types presented 
above. In theory, this type of governance structure would decrease the number of 
veto players involved, but as Limaye et al. [20] have shown, in practice the situation 
is often more complex. Necessary increases in the funding of new programs, for 
instance, is likely to be at least partly outside of the control of this type of agency, 
creating a space for obstruction. The CAFE standards example certainly illustrates 
this, and it is not entirely clear how an agency completely independent from the 
executive branch would have been shielded from this constraining, which reminds 
us of the utmost importance of the political obstruction dimension.   
Moreover, energy efficiency measures often involve standards of various 
sorts, and the potential for a lack of policy coordination, whether at the 
international or national level, is also important. As briefly illustrated through the 
example of electric motors, this barrier is worst when it impedes the development 
of international markets for more energy efficient technologies. This is not a 
difficulty specific to energy efficiency measures, of course, as authors on trade and 
globalization have pointed out for a long time. Cooperation of individual countries in 
the establishment of global standards, especially in areas where state intervention 
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may be seen by many as unnecessary or unwarranted, is always a tall task. 
Nevertheless, the increased attention given to energy efficiency in policy circles in 
recent years seems to indicate a push for this cooperation to materialize, as was the 
case for electric motors.  
Some limitations to our classification and definitions are worth mentioning. 
In particular, the illustrative examples are all from North America, where the 
context of energy production and consumption may be different from elsewhere, 
not least because of the abundance of many of the energy resources. Because of this, 
generalizations based on our classification – and the resulting recommendations to 
eliminate these barriers, for instance – should be made with care. The categories 
described above are intended to be general, and cannot substitute for empirical 
studies that would investigate the details of cases such as the political regime, or the 
veto players and veto points present at the national level. The same is true for the 
need to evaluate whether there are trends in how some of these barriers affect 
different industries, sectors, or firm sizes, as we mentioned in section 2.  
Despite these limitations, the cases provide some ideas for further research. 
Clearly, it seems crucial to consider the actions and decisions of government actors 
and institutions, as they produce barriers of their own that end up preventing the 
adoption of cost-effective and energy-efficient technologies by individual firms. This 
suggests several reasons why it may be misleading to study the barriers too 
narrowly in terms of what constrains the decision by firms to adopt cost-effective 
technologies (as Sorrell et al’s oft-used definition leads to). Reasons why attention 
should be paid specifically to political actors and the barriers they control are many.  
As recent studies of drivers of energy efficiency have shown (notably [18]), 
government actors have an important role to play in supporting enterprises in 
removing or reducing barriers, in other words they are crucial stakeholders in 
promoting possible drivers to energy efficiency improvements. For instance, as 
government actors and institutions aim to improve the energy efficiency of entire 
sectors or industries, they may attempt to put in place rules or programs that will 
affect these decisions by firms, aiming to remove or reduce information barriers or 
inertia. However, as the discussion above shows, government actors themselves face 
barriers in doing so. Giving proper attention to barriers of this type is then essential, 
and in several cases this is unlikely to come out of surveys of industry actors.   
Another example is illustrated in the second case study above: sometimes the 
firm making the decisions is a public monopoly, which may have an impact on its 
decisions to pursue aggressive energy efficiency policies – or not. A transfer of 
responsibilities for energy efficiency objectives and enforcement from the monopoly 
to an independent agency, for instance, may go a long way to produce 
improvements in the end result.  
More generally, what we want to convey with this contribution is the notion 
that although increased attention to all types of barriers to energy efficiency in 
recent years is welcome, efforts in this regard may be futile or severely limited if 
sufficient attention is not paid to barriers of the political-institutional type. 
Understanding the dynamics underlying these barriers is essential to the pursuit of 
energy efficiency, and the correct identification of certain types of barriers as well as 
combinations and interactions between different instances, are key steps in the 
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elaboration of solutions to such barriers. A holistic approach to these obstacles 
remains the only way to ensure that they are properly addressed, as others have 
also pointed out (e.g., [35,69]).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article presented and categorized barriers to the adoption and 
successful implementation of energy efficiency measures, where they have their 
origin in political institutions in a broad sense. Across the three categories of 
political obstruction, conflicting guidelines in governance structure, and lack of 
policy coordination, several more specific barriers can prevent progress with regard 
to energy efficiency. 
In addition to the need for further empirical investigation of these barriers, 
an important next step is to extend this analysis to energy efficiency drivers, as 
several authors have pointed out in recent studies (e.g., [18,35,47,70,71]). This is 
particularly relevant to analyses of political-institutional barriers, because these 
may not merely prevent decisions and behaviors: they may be directly preventing 
drivers for energy efficiency improvements to be put forward, enacted, or enforced. 
Future research must look into ways to eliminate or prevent them, so that efforts by 
all stakeholders to tap into the “first fuel” of energy efficiency produce maximal 
results. 
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9. Appendix 
 
Table 2 – Institutional models for energy efficiency implementation and governance 
Model Examples Main advantages Main limitations 
(1) Government agency 
with broad energy 
responsibilities 
U.S. Dept. of Energy  
Danish Energy 
authority 
Good visibility and credibility; 
Access to larger parent organization’s resources; 
Greater clout in obtaining government funds; 
Integration of EE within broad sector objectives. 
EE may not get sufficient priority for resources; 
EE function may not receive adequate attention or 
resources if top management is not committed; 
Large bureaucracy may impede decision making 
(2) Government agency 
focusing primarily on 
clean energy or 
sustainable energy 
Australian 
Greenhouse Office 
Mexico: CONAE 
Agency focus consistent with EE; 
Dedicated “clean energy” agency provides greater 
voice in sector policy and obtaining resources 
Narrower focus (size of the agency) provides less clout; 
The combining of EE with other sustainable energy 
options, may lead to a decreased emphasis on EE. 
(3) Government agency 
focusing entirely on 
energy efficiency 
Canada: Office of 
Energy Efficiency 
Brazil: PROCEL 
Focus is entirely on EE: dedicated staff; 
Opportunity to create a pro-EE agency culture; 
Possible leveraging of other resources. 
Narrower focus (size of the agency) provides less clout; 
Success highly dependent on effective top management; 
Agency must compete for resources, and may not be 
isolated from broader energy policy agenda. 
(4) Independent 
authority created by 
statute to promote 
energy efficiency/clean 
energy 
U.K.: Energy Saving 
Trust 
Sustainable Energy 
Ireland 
Independence facilitates operational discretion; 
Flexibility in accessing outside advice and support, 
in hiring management and staff, and fund raising. 
Agency may not be viewed as mainstream by other 
government agencies and some stakeholders; 
Potential competition between ISA and public agencies; 
Less direct access to public funding; 
Changing scope may require legislation. 
(5) Independent 
corporation owned 
entirely by the 
government 
South Africa: NEEA 
Korea Energy 
Management 
Corporation 
Independence facilitates operational discretion; 
Access to private-sector talent/technical capacity; 
Ability to form joint ventures and subsidiaries; 
Flexibility to obtain external inputs and funds. 
Less direct access to public funding; 
Board composition will determine effectiveness; 
Agency may not be viewed as mainstream; 
Potential competition with public agencies. 
(6) Corporation through 
public-private 
partnership  
Polish National 
Conservation Agency 
Germany: DENA 
Agency can benefit from private sector 
participation since EE programs need mobilization 
of the private sector for implementation; 
Independence allows greater flexibility in decisions. 
Potential conflicts may arise due to different objectives 
and/or perspectives of the private and public partners; 
Partnerships have less direct access to public funding. 
(7) Non-profit or non-
governmental 
organization 
Austrian Energy 
Agency 
Croatia Energy 
Institute 
NGOs have greater credibility with some 
stakeholders; 
EE focus helps build core competencies; 
Flexibility in obtaining external inputs and funding. 
NGOs have less direct access to public funding; 
Some stakeholders (such as industrial firms) may not 
find the NGO a credible source for EE information; 
NGO governance structure may impose other strictures.  
Source: Adapted from [20, pp. xii–xiii, pp. 25–33] 
